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ARE TWELVE HEADS BETTER
THAN ONE?
PHOEBE C. ELLSWORTH*
INTRODUCTION
Few advocates of the jury system would argue that the average juror is as
competent a tribunal as the averagejudge. Whatever competence the jury has
is a function of two of its attributes: its number and its interaction. The fact
that a jury must be composed of at least six people,' with different
backgrounds, experiences, and perspectives, provides some protection
against decisions based on an idiosyncratic view of the facts. Not only must
the jury include at least six people, but they must be chosen in a manner that
conforms to the ideal of the jury as representative of community opinion.2
The jury's competence, unlike that of the judge, rests partly on its ability to
reflect the perspectives, experiences, and values of the ordinary people in the
community-not just the most common or typical community perspective, but
the whole range of viewpoints. Representativeness is important not only for
ensuring "the essential nature of the jury as a tribunal embodying a broad
democratic ideal," 3 but because it affects the jury's competence directly.
Failure to assure that any given group has a fair chance of participation
"deprives the jury of a perspective on human events that may have
unsuspected importance in any case that may be presented." 4
Copyright © 1989 by Law and Contemporary Problems
* Professor, Law School and Department of Psychology, University of Michigan.
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1. Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 228 (1978) (five-member jury does not satisfy the jury trial
guarantee of the sixth amendment).
2. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880) (equal protection clause guarantees the
defendant that the state will not exclude members of his race from the jury venire on account of
race); Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co., 328 U.S. 217 (1946) (in an exercise of its supervisory power, the
Court granted a new trial where jury had been chosen in a manner which systematically excluded
persons who were wage workers); Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975) (fair cross-section
requirement of the sixth amendment is violated by the systematic exclusion of women); Duren v.
Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 (1979) (state statute providing for automatic exemption from jury service for
any woman requesting not to serve which produces jury venires averaging less than 15% female
violates the sixth amendment's fair cross-section requirement); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79
(1986) (prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges to exclude blacks from a jury trying a black
defendant establishes an equal protection claim of purposeful discrimination). These cases are a
small selection of major landmarks in the development of the definition of representativeness as a
fundamental characteristic of fair juries.
3. Ellsworth & Getman, Social Science in Legal Decision-making, in LAW AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES
596 (L. Lipson & S. Wheeler eds. 1986).
4. Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 503-04 (1972) (plurality opinion of Marshall, J., joined by
Douglas and Stewart, JJ.).
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A jury decision, however, is more than an average of the verdict
preferences of six or twelve citizens who represent a variety of experiences.
Ideally, the knowledge, perspectives, and memories of the individual
members are compared and combined, and individual errors and biases are
discovered and discarded, so that the final verdict is forged from a shared
understanding of the case. 'This understanding is more complete and more
accurate than any of the separate versions that contributed to it, or indeed
than their average. This transcendent understanding is the putative benefit of
the deliberation process.
There is a good deal of evidence that jurors commonly organize the mass
of testimony they hear into a story5 with characters, motives, and plot.
Incoming information is assimilated to the basic story framework, and
information that does not fit is often forgotten or explained away. It is well
known among psychologists that much of what is perceived is a function of the
perceiver; it is a particular construal of the events perceived, rather than a true
reflection. 6 Several different perceivers will come up with several somewhat
dissimilar accounts of a sequence of events. Once having arrived at a
construal, or a story or explanation of the same sequence of events, most
people find it very difficult to imagine a different way of interpreting the same
events, and this leads them to underestimate severely their own creative
contribution to their "memory." 7 Even though most people recognize in
principle that a good deal of perception is really interpretation, they are
unable to make adequate inferential adjustments for this process in guiding
their own behavior, often behaving exactly as they would if their
interpretation were the only possible one.8
If it does nothing else, group deliberation (except in extraordinarily one-
sided cases) forces people to realize that there are different ways of
interpreting the same facts. While this rarely provokes a prompt revision of
their own views, it necessarily reminds the jury members that their
perceptions are partly conjectural-an obvious truth, but one that is otherwise
unlikely to occur to them. A judge does not have this vivid reminder that
alternative construals are possible.
A judge, however, has experience on the bench and training in the law.
Critics of the jury often focus on the incompetence of people chosen as jurors,
compared to that of the judge. At best the venire consists of a representative
sample of the community, with a few members having genuine expertise, a
5. See W. BENNETT & M. FELDMAN, RECONSTRUCTING REALITY IN THE COURTROOM (1981);
Pennington & Hastie, Evidence Evaluation in Complex Decision Making, 51 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOLOGY 242 (1986); Pennington & Hastie, Explanation-Based Decision Making: Effects of Memory
Structure on Judgment, 14 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY: LEARNING, MEMORY & COGNITION 521 (1988).
6. See D. SCHNEIDER, A. HASTORF & P. ELLSWORTH, PERSON PERCEPTION (1979); Ross, The
Problem of Construal in Social Inference and Social Psychology, in A DISTINCTIVE APPROACH TO
PSYCHOLOGICAL RESEARCH: THE INFLUENCE OF STANLEY SCHACHTER (N. Grunberg, R. Nisbett &J.
Singer eds. 1987).
7. D. Griffin, D. Dunning & L. Ross, The Role of Construal Processes in Overconfident
Predictions about the Self and Others (1988) (unpublished manuscript, Stanford University).
8. Id.
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large number who are simply average citizens, and a few others who are
distinctly below average. In practice, many of the better-educated jurors are
excused from service, and others who show knowledge or ability relevant to
the particular case at trial may be challenged during the voir dire. Attorneys
select jurors for incompetence. 9 Thus, some have argued that the average
jury is not only less competent than the average judge, but is also less
competent than a random sample of twelve citizens from the community.
Pointing out the discrepancy in the qualifications of the average juror and
the average judge is one common tactic used to criticize the jury. A second is
to point to particular cases, usually highly publicized cases, where the jury
verdict seems inappropriate. When a John Hinckley is acquitted or a $10
billion damage award is set, many citizens are outraged and look for someone
or something to blame. When the judge decides, typically they blame the
individual judge. When the jury decides, they blame the jury system (or
occasionally the governing law). The practice of drawing conclusions about
an institution on the basis of a tiny handful of highly publicized cases is, of
course, scientifically and logically unsound, though no doubt inevitable.
Historically, the debate over the competence of juries has been less
enlightening than it might have been. In particular, there are two
conspicuous omissions. First, there is a great reluctance to define competent
decisionmaking. Social scientists who turn to the legal literature in search of
criteria by which to evaluate the jury are likely to find it a frustrating
experience. It is extremely difficult to design research that will contribute
useful information to the debate on competence when the concept of
competence is not defined. Second, most of the social science research and
much of the legal debate has focused primarily on the jury's verdict, an
extremely crude measure of competence, and one that tells us very little about
what juries actually do.
Among social scientists, one way to look at jury functioning is to break
down the jury's task into components, and look at the way the jury deals with
each one. Pennington and Hastie I0 have provided a useful list:
1) The jury members must "encode" the information they get at
trial. A competent jury must pay attention to the testimony and
remember it.
2) The jury must define the legal categories. A competent jury
should define these categories as they are presented in the judges'
instructions.
3) The jury must select the admissible evidence and ignore
evidence that is inadmissible.
4) The jury must construct the sequence of events.
5) The jury must evaluate the credibility of the witnesses.
9. SeeJ. VAN DYKE, JuRY SELECTION PROCEDURES (1977); V. HANS & N. VIDMAR, JUDGING THE
JURY 63-78 (1986).
10. Pennington & Hastie,juror Decision Mlaking Models: The Generalization Gap, 89 PSYCHOLOGICAL
BULL. 246, 249-55 (1981).
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6) The jury must evaluate the evidence in relation to the legal
categories provided in the instructions. That is, certain elements of
the story the jury constructs are particularly important in
determining the appropriate verdict. The jury must identify these
elements and understand how differences in the interpretation of
the facts translate into differences in the appropriate verdict choice.
7) The jury must test its interpretation of the facts and the implied
verdict choice against the standard of proof: preponderance of
evidence, clear and convincing evidence, or beyond a reasonable
doubt.
8) The jury must decide on the verdict.
This list is meant to provide a set of reminders of what a jury must do to
accomplish its task. There is no assumption that the jury performs these tasks
in the order listed, nor that it should. No decisionmaking group indefatigably
sticks to the task throughout the course of its discussions, and juries are no
exception. In discussing my research on jury deliberations, I present data and
some impressions of how the jury performs these tasks; I also discuss some
other aspects of jury deliberation.
The research itself involved the close analysis of the first hour of
deliberation of eighteen mock juries.'' Because of the small sample size,
statistical analysis of the data generally would be misguided. The study is
most usefully considered as an intensive case study of the process of jury
deliberation, although the fact that there are eighteen cases rather than one
makes it considerably more useful than the usual case study, because it allows
for some assessment of the variability ofjuries exposed to the same stimulus.
A major drawback is that none of the juries reached a verdict in the hour
allotted to them. 12 Thus, the study is most useful as an exploration of how
juries structure their task, how well they deal with the facts and the law, and
what things they discuss. It is very likely that at some point juries move into
an "end game" that may differ substantially from the phases preceding it.
II
METHOD
A. Subjects and Overview
Two hundred and sixteen adults eligible for jury service in Santa Clara or
San Mateo County, California, participated in the deliberation study and
11. The deliberation data were collected as part of a study of the relationship between death
penalty attitudes and perceptions of guilt. Results relevant to this issue are reported in Cowan,
Thompson & Ellsworth, The Effects of Death Qualification on Jurors' Predisposition to Convict and On the
Quality of Deliberation, 8 LAW & HuM. BEAV. 53 (1984).
12. Five of the juries had reached 10-2 splits by the end of the hour, as assessed by post-
deliberation questionnaires on verdict preferences. The trial used in the research was the same one
reported in R. HASTIE, S. PENROD & N. PENNINGTON, INSIDE THE JURY (1983). They found that
twelve-person juries operating under a unanimity rule took an average of two hours and 18 minutes
to reach a verdict.
[Vol. 52: No. 4
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provided usable data.13 Thirty-three of them were recruited from the venire
lists of the Santa Clara County Superior Court after completion of their terms
as jurors. Of the remaining 183 subjects, 156 had responded to a classified
advertisement in local newspapers asking for volunteers for a study of "how
jurors make decisions." The final twenty-five people were referred by friends
who had heard of the study or who were subjects themselves. Each subject
was paid ten dollars for participation.
The sample was fairly representative of the suburban upper-middle-class
community surrounding Stanford University, except that males and minorities
were underrepresented. The sample was 93 percent white and 65.3 percent
female. The average age of the subjects was forty-three, and 63 percent of the
sample was employed outside the home. Married persons constituted 45
percent of the sample; 26 percent were single, 19 percent divorced, 4 percent
separated, and 6 percent widowed. The median educational level was slightly
less than a college degree. Democrats made up 46.2 percent of the sample,
Republicans 32.4 percent, and Independents 11.6 percent, with the
remainder divided among unregistered voters and small parties. In the
category of religious affiliation, one-third of the sample listed themselves as
Protestant, 15 percent as Catholic, and 9 percent as Jewish; 26 percent listed
no affiliation, and 17 percent listed other religions. Finally, 46 percent of the
sample had previously performed jury duty, while 37 percent had actually
served on juries.
Subjects watched a videotape of a simulated homicide trial that
represented all major aspects of an actual criminal trial. After hearing the
evidence, arguments, and instructions, the jurors gave an initial verdict.
Jurors were then assigned to twelve-person juries and allowed to deliberate
for one hour.
B. The Trial Videotape
After viewing simulated trial materials prepared by several other social
scientists interested injury behavior, and after considering creating materials
of our own, we chose the videotape prepared by Reid Hastie for use in his
research on jury unanimity.' 4 This tape is representative of the procedures,
setting, style, and issues that commonly occur in actual homicide trials. The
case was complex enough to afford several plausible interpretations and
verdict preferences. It resembled most real murder trials in that there was no
question that the defendant had killed the victim; rather, the evidence
centered on the precise sequence of events preceding the killing and on the
defendant's state of mind at the time. Finally, the tape was far more vivid and
13. The study included 20juries, but two had to be dropped from the analysis, one because of
equipment failure in the sound recording, and the other because one of its members was an amateur
actor who had recently starred in a production of 12 Angry Men (Orion-Nova/UA 1957) and who
dominated deliberation using arguments and reasoning drawn from that play.
14. R. HASTIE, S. PENROD & N. PENNINGTON, supra note 12.
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realistic than any others we have encountered. It was highly unlikely that we
could have constructed a better tape with our resources.
Hastie's videotape is a reenactment of an actual homicide case based on a
complete transcript of the original trial. Each actor portraying a defense or
prosecution witness was provided with "a summary of the case highlighting
his or her testimony." 15 The judge and the lawyers, portrayed by an actual
judge and two experienced criminal attorneys, were given "unabridged copies
of the actual judge's instructions, selections of relevant testimony, and the
actual attorney's opening and closing arguments as they were originally
presented."' 6 The attorneys were asked to develop their cases as they would
for a real trial. The witnesses were asked to review their materials to get their
version of the events firmly in mind. Then, for the actual taping, all actors put
aside their materials and engaged in "spontaneous improvisations closely
following the original case." 17
We modified the tape in two ways for the present research. First, we
shortened it slightly by deleting one defense witness whose testimony added
little. Second, we replaced the segment of the original tape containing the
judge's instructions, which had been based on Massachusetts law, with a new
sequence in which the applicable California law was given. The new
instructions were derived from California Jury Instructions, Criminal (CALJIC,
1970)18 and were assembled in consultation with trial attorneys and law
professors. Professor William Keogh of Stanford Law School portrayed the
presiding judge in the new sequence. The version of the tape we used lasted
two and one-half hours, including one-half hour of judge's instructions.
Pretesting indicated that the tape was regarded as convincing and realistic. 19
In the trial videotape, the defendant, Frank Johnson, is charged with first-
degree murder for the stabbing of Alan Caldwell outside a neighborhood bar.
The prosecution brings evidence that the defendant and victim had argued in
the bar earlier that day, and that Caldwell had threatened the defendant with a
straight razor. Johnson had left after the argument, but had returned with a
friend that evening. Johnson was carrying a fishing knife in his pocket.
Caldwell later came into the bar, and he and the defendant went outside and
began to argue loudly. Two witnesses testify that they saw Johnson stab
down into Caldwell's body. The victim's razor was subsequently found folded
in his left rear pocket.
15. Id. at 47.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. COMMITrEE ON STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS, CRIMINAL, CALIFORNIA JURY INSTRUCTIONS,
CRIMINAL (3d ed. 1970).
19. Aside from the successful use of this tape by Hastie, Penrod, and Pennington, whose study
provides substantial evidence of its realism, the pretest evidence comes from seven attorneys, a
judge, two law professors, and about 30 nonprofessionals to whom we showed the tape before we ran
the actual study. Although we took no formal ratings, none of the pretest subjects found any flaws in
the film, except to point out that the defendant looked a little old for his stated age and that a real
trial would have more delays. See R. HASTIE, S. PENROD & N. PENNINGTON, supra note 12.
[Vol. 52: No. 4
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For the defense, Johnson testifies that he had returned to the bar that
evening on the invitation of his friend and had entered only after ascertaining
that Caldwell was not there. Caldwell had come in later and had asked
Johnson to step outside, presumably for the purpose of patching up their
quarrel. Once outside, Caldwell had hit him and had come at him with a
razor. Johnson had pulled out a fishing knife which he often carried in his
pocket and Caldwell had run onto the knife. Johnson's friend corroborates
much of this testimony. In cross-examination, the defense attorney casts
doubt on the ability of the prosecution's eyewitnesses to see the scuffle, and
shows that medical evidence cannot establish whether the defendant stabbed
down into the victim or the victim ran onto the knife.
Four verdicts are possible in this case, depending upon the jury's findings
of the facts. The defendant may be guilty of first-degree murder, of second-
degree murder, of voluntary manslaughter, or he may be not guilty for reason
of self-defense or accidental homicide.
C. Procedure
The study was conducted on weekend afternoons at Stanford University.
Each subject group consisted of twelve to thirty-six subjects. Upon their
arrival, all subjects were shown to an auditorium, asked to fill out an
informed-consent form and a preliminary questionnaire, and given a brief
overview of the study. The questionnaire focused on background
(demographic) characteristics, general attitudes toward the death penalty and
toward criminal defendants, and general attitudes with respect to crime
control and due process. 20 The experimenter then introduced the trial
videotape:
Now we would like to show you a videotape reenactment of an actual criminal trial.
This trial took place in Boston, and nothing has been changed, except, of course, for
the names. You will be asked to reach a verdict based on the facts of the case and the
law the judge explains to you,just as you would if you were an actualjuror. We would
like you to pay close attention to the testimony and the judge's instructions and to try
to take the case as seriously as you would if you were actually serving on a jury. While
you are listening to the case, you should not communicate with anyone else, and you
should not take any notes, because we want your experience to be as much like that of
a real juror as possible.
During the two and one-half hours while the subjects were watching the
videotape, the experimenters assigned the participants to twelve-person
juries. All jury assignments were random, subject to the following
constraints: (1) juries could not contain members who were acquainted; (2)
juries could not contain more than one student member; and (3) numbers of
male jury members and of persons recruited from the jury list were roughly
equalized across juries.2'
20. See Fitzgerald & Ellsworth, Due Process vs. Crime Control: Death Qualification andJury Attitudes, 8
LAW & HUM. BEnAV. 31 (1984); Packer, Two Models of the Criminal Process, 113 U. PA. L. REX'. 1 (1964).
21. One-half of the juries included from two to four members who would be ineligible to sit on
real juries in capital cases due to their attitudes against the death penalty; the other half did not,
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As soon as the videotape was over, the experimenter asked the subjects to
indicate their verdict preferences on an initial verdict questionnaire by
checking one of four choices: first-degree murder, second-degree murder,
manslaughter, or not guilty. After collecting the initial verdict questionnaires,
the experimenter read off the jury assignments and directed the members of
each jury to a separate room for deliberation. The rooms were seminar
rooms, each containing a table with ample space for five people along each
side and one at each end. A videotape camera was placed behind the person
sitting at one end of the table, and two ceiling microphones were used to
record the audio track. The camera and microphones recorded the
deliberations for later analysis. The equipment also allowed the
experimenters to view the deliberations on a monitor outside the deliberation
room, in order to detect problems that might jeopardize the validity of the
study.
Once the subjects were settled in the jury room, the experimenter told
them that their next task was to discuss the case and try to reach a verdict.
They were assured that their immediate postvideotape verdict was
confidential and that they need not feel committed to it. They were also told
that most juries began by taking a straw vote, and that in any case they should
choose a foreman before beginning their deliberation. The experimenter
continued as follows:
As you discuss the case, it is important to put yourselves into the role of jurors.
Imagine that you are a real jury and that your verdict will actually determine the fate of
the defendant you saw on the tape. We want you to make your decision only on the
basis of what you saw on the tape. Although the characters in the trial you saw were
actors, we want you to treat them as if they were real. In short, we want you to make
the decision you would make if you were a real jury and if you had seen in court
exactly what you saw on the tape.
The experimenter closed by informing the subjects that they had one hour
in which to deliberate, and that they should try to reach a decision in that
time, although quite possibly one hour would not be long enough to reach a
consensus. The purpose of this instruction was simply to assure that the
subjects worked on their deliberation seriously and tried to reconcile their
differences of opinion. We did not ask them to take a vote at the end of the
hour, and we did not expect them to reach a verdict.
Subjects were then left to discuss the case. Although they appeared to be
slightly self-conscious in the presence of the recording equipment for the first
minute or two, the jurors became highly involved in the discussion and
seemed to forget about the camera as soon as the deliberations revealed
disagreements among the members, which, for each jury, occurred almost
immediately. After an hour the experimenter returned, stopped the
deliberation, and handed out the postexperiment questionnaires.
The videotaped jury deliberations were transcribed, and the transcripts
were divided into units. In devising the coding scheme, I identified thirty
Differences between these two types of juries are not discussed here. See Cowan, Thompson &
Ellsworth, supra note 11.
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major issues in the case. A unit, by definition, could contain no more than
one of these issues. Short utterances occasionally contained none; long
utterances were divided into units corresponding to the number of issues.
Each transcript was coded by one or more of three trained coders. 22 Each
unit was coded for the general nature of the statement (issue, fact, law, vote,
procedural comment, and so on), correctness, prodefense or proprosecution
position, and the particular fact, issue, or point of law that was mentioned.2 3
Coders met weekly with me to resolve questions and settle differences.
III
CHOOSING A FOREMAN
All juries began by choosing a foreman, not surprisingly, since the
experimenter had instructed them to do so. The foreman was always chosen
very quickly, with a minimum of discussion. For ten of the eighteen juries, the
process of foreman selection can be summed up by the phrase "choose a man
who says he has experience." Although 65 percent of the jurors were female,
sixteen of the eighteen foremen were male. 2 4 On the jury composed of eleven
women and one man, the man was chosen.
When the jurors had arrived in the room and settled in their seats,
someone would point out that their first job was to chose a foreman, and then
typically someone would ask, "Has anybody had any experience with this sort
of thing?" A man would claim experience, and the other jurors would agree
that he should take the job. Occasionally two men would claim experience
and a brief "after you, Alphonse" discussion would ensue until one of them
said, "all right, I'll do it." These two scenarios account for foreman selection
in ten of the eighteen juries. Since we knew which of our subjects had actually
served on real juries, we were able to find out whether the people chosen as
foreman were actually more likely to have had prior jury experience than the
other jurors. They were not more experienced: 39 percent of the foremen
had served on juries, as compared with 36 percent of the other jurors, an
insignificant difference. Thus, a foreman is someone who claims experience,
not necessarily someone who has it.25
22. The author is deeply grateful to John Krueger, Margaret Campbell, and particularly Michael
J. Sandmire, who served as coders and helped to develop the coding system, and to Pamela Burke,
who also worked on the coding scheme and devised ways to calculate reliabilities.
23. Coders were given lists of 110 case facts, 18 major issues, and 60 legal instructions (all
included "other" choices). At various points during the coding, two coders were asked to code the
same jury, in order to calculate inter-coder reliability. Considering all of the coding categories,
coders made 62 decisions for each unit. Overall agreement ranged from 47% to 69%. For the
major categories, rates of agreement were as follows: Issues (62-98%); Facts (72-80%); and Legal
Norms (73-87%). All differences of opinion were resolved by group discussion.
24. This gender bias in choice of a foreperson has changed little over the last 40 years. See
Strodtbeck, James & Hawkins, Social Status injury Deliberations, 22 AM. Soc. REv. 713 (1957). It occurs
not only in mock-jury research, but in real trials. See Kerr, Harmon & Graves, Independence of Multiple
Verdicts byJurors andjuries, 12J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 12, 24-25 (1982); Note, Gender Dynamics and
jury Deliberations, 96 YALE L.J. 593 (1987).
25. It is possible, of course, that the men who volunteered interpreted the term "experience" as
broadly covering experience leading committee meetings, work groups, club meetings, or other
Page 205: Autumn 1989]
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On the remaining eight juries, five foremen (four male, one female) were
chosen because they were sitting in one of the two end seats, and three (two
male, one female) were individuals who had opened the discussion by
volunteering for the position. Altogether, nine of the foremen were sitting at
the head of the table, and four others were sitting in the chair right next to the
head. Table position is by no means a subtle proxemic cue that exerts an
unconscious influence on the jurors: In the majority of cases the jurors
explicitly gave table position as their reason for their choice-"you should do
it, you're sitting in the right place."2 6
These data suggest that jurors give little consideration to their selection of
foremen. They are generally given no information on what qualifications to
look for, so they have little to guide them but their background knowledge
and stereotypes of the jury, gained from the media and other sources. In the
movies, the foreman sits at the head of the table. In addition, at the time that
the foreman is chosen, most jurors may still regard their task as a relatively
simple one, because the extent and depth of disagreement on the jury has not
yet been revealed. In light of people's inability to imagine alternative
interpretations of a set of facts they have already interpreted,2 7 jurors
probably overestimate the popularity of their own position and the degree of
consensus on the jury before they begin deliberating.2 8 Thus, they may not
think it makes much difference who is chosen foreman, because they see the
case as a straightforward one and do not anticipate serious disputes. Finally,
since no disagreements have yet been revealed, it is likely that strong norms
of courtesy prevail at the time that the foreman is selected. Once someone
has been suggested, the others may think it is impolite to question his or her
ability.
IV
STRUCTURING THE TASK
Once the foreman was selected, the juries took one of two approaches to
the task. One-half of the juries began by taking a vote, roughly evenly divided
between show-of-hands, secret ballot, and a go-round procedure where each
juror states a position and says a little about his or her reasons for taking that
position. The other half of the juries began by discussing the facts and issues
gatherings. We do not have sufficient background data on ourjurors to test whether those chosen as
foremen actually had more of this sort of broadly construed "experience" than the other jurors. In
any case, no prospective foremen volunteered specific information about these other kinds of
experience, and no jury members requested it.
26. See Strodtbeck & Hook, The Social Dimensions of a Twelve-ilan Jury Table, 24 SOCIOMETRY 397
(1961).
27. See Ross, supra note 6; Griffin, Dunning & Ross, supra note 7.
28. See Ross, Greene & House, The "False Consensus Effect".- An Egocentric Bias in Social Perception
and Attribution Processes, 13 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 279 (1977). The tendency to
overestimate the popularity of one's own position is pervasive in social perception. One might
expect it to be exaggerated among members of a jury, since they all know that they have seen the
exact same trial. Thus, many potential plausible reasons for expecting differences of opinion are
ruled out.
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in the case. The judge's instructions contained a caution to the jurors not to
become unduly committed to their position but to remain open-minded. A
few jurors interpreted these instructions to mean that they should not begin
deliberations with a vote.
Hastie 29 and his colleagues have proposed that when a jury postpones a
formal vote, it is freer to raise issues and discuss them open-mindedly. When
a jury begins by voting, people feel committed to the position they have
publicly expressed, and spend their time defending their position rather than
trying to understand the facts and the law. Our data generally support the
findings of Hastie's research. Juries that postponed voting talked more than
juries that began with a vote, spent more time talking about the important
issues in the case, and brought out more facts.30 One might hypothesize that
juries that voted early would spend more time discussing the relevant law,
because they would need to define the legal verdict categories before they
could vote. This, however, was not the case. Early versus late voting did not
predict amount of time spent discussing the law.
Whether or not a jury began by voting, it was quickly apparent to the
members of the jury that they disagreed about the appropriate verdict.
Although the jurors had watched a simulated trial, their differences of opinion
were real. As soon as these disagreements emerged, the character of the
deliberation changed. During the selection of the foreman there was an
atmosphere of conviviality in the jury room, along with some degree of self-
consciousness. A few jurors joked about the videotape camera. Once the
discussion or an early vote revealed differences of opinion, the jurors became
involved in the task. There were no more references to the camera and very
few jokes of any sort. They kept their attention focused on the case. On the
average 47 percent of their utterances (defined in terms of units), 3 1 concerned
the facts of the case (range: 28 percent-57 percent); 32 percent addressed the
important contested issues (for example, defendant's state of mind,
provocation, angle of the knife thrust, ability of various witnesses to see the
crime) (range: 22 percent-38 percent); 21 percent dealt with the law and the
judge's instructions (range: 10 percent-40 percent); and 7 percent were votes
or discussions about calling for a vote (range: 3 percent- 17 percent). These
proportions are quite comparable to those found by Hastie, Penrod, and
Pennington, whose juries saw the same case but deliberated to a final verdict.
The criticism that juries approach their task in a frivolous manner receives no
support from this study or from any other serious empirical research on the
jury. 32
29. See R. HASTIE, S. PENROD & N. PENNINGTON, supra note 12; see also Hawkins, Interaction Rates of
jurors Aligned in Factions, 27 AM. Soc. REV. 689 (1962).
30. The nine juries who voted early voted within the first 36 units of deliberation (see supra text
accompanying note 22). Of the nine juries that postponed voting, none voted earlier than Unit
#254, and four did not vote at all during the hour of deliberation.
31. See supra text accompanying note 23.
32. See generally Hans & Vidmar, supra note 9.
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Whether or not the jury began with a vote, the general progression of the
deliberation moved from an emphasis on facts toward an emphasis on law. In
juries that did not begin by voting, the initial discussion resembled a random
walk through the facts and issues. A topic would be raised, discussed briefly,
and replaced by a totally different topic, with little attempt to organize the
discussion and no attempt to resolve the issues. These juries conformed very
closely to Kalven and Zeisel's observation that "the talk moves in small bursts
of coherence, shifting from topic to topic with remarkable flexibility. It
touches an issue, leaves it, and returns again."3 3 During the hour of
deliberation, the important facts and issues would come up again and again,
while trivial issues would be dropped, and new issues added. Typically, as an
issue was examined and re-examined, there would be movement toward
consensus.
For example, one of the most important pieces of evidence in the trial was
the coroner's statement that he found the victim's razor folded up in his back
left pocket. Had the victim been coming at the defendant with the razor, a
self-defense scenario would have been very plausible. The defendant and his
friend claimed to have seen the razor drawn; two other witnesses testified that
they did not see the razor. Most juries raised this issue early and dropped it
without fully considering the implications. In subsequent discussions,
someone would raise the possibility that the victim somehow, in a reflex-like
action, could have folded up the razor and pocketed it after he was stabbed, or
that someone else (the policeman, the ambulance doctor, or a passer-by)
might have picked it up and put it in the dead man's pocket. The jury would
eventually conclude that these possibilities were far-fetched. This conclusion
would lead them to agree that the victim never pulled the razor during the
fatal confrontation. As a consequence, some juries would reject the
possibility of self-defense and a few would turn their attention to the relevant
question of the defendant's possible belief that the razor was drawn. In
general, over the course of deliberation, jurors appear to focus more on the
important facts and issues, come to a clearer understanding of them, and
approach consensus on the facts.
In juries that began with a vote, the discussion tended to be slightly more
organized. The average distribution of verdicts prior to deliberation was one
for first-degree murder, two for second-degree murder, six for manslaughter,
and two for not guilty. Although none of the juries showed exactly this
pattern, most of them had a majority of votes in the two middle categories
with outliers for not guilty or for both not guilty and first-degree murder. A
common tactic was for the middle jurors to begin by asking the outliers to
explain their deviant position, typically starting with the proponents of first-
degree murder. Whether or not the jury began with a vote, however, issues
were raised and dropped fairly unsystematically, then raised again; slowly,
progress was made. Little by little, most juries resolved the issues of fact and
33. See H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 486 (1966).
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spent an increasing proportion of their time on the central issue: the
defendant's state of mind.
A. The Jury's Ability to Deal with the Facts
Kalven and Zeisel conclude that "the jury does by and large understand
the facts and get the case straight." 34 The juries in our study spent more time
discussing the facts of the case (47 percent of the units included references to
facts brought out in testimony) than anything else. These were rarely purely
factual statements. Most of the time facts were raised in connection with a
contested issue ("If the officer could clearly identify Frank and saw that he was
doing something so that he should say, 'Frank, don't do it,' then that shows
that he had very good vision."), a reference to common sense or knowledge
("There's only one way that bone could have been struck and it had to be like
that. You couldn't strike down like that and hit right here."), a hypothetical
scenario ("Suppose that-that he gets up with the knife, and Caldwell has the
razor in this hand, and Caldwell, who is what, 200 pounds, six feet, 200
pounds, lunges toward him."), or a reference to the law ("The razor was in
that man's back left pocket ... so it couldn't have been murder by reason of
the man defending himself.").
Most of the juries managed to sort out the factual issues fairly well during
the process of deliberation. Conflicting testimony (for example, about the
angle of the knife thrust) was recognized as such, so that juries ended up
correctly attributing different versions of the story to different witnesses.
Questions regarding the distance and angle of vision of the various witnesses
were generally resolved correctly, and errors of fact generally were corrected.
None of the juries maintained an erroneous perception of an important fact
after the hour of deliberation. Implausible suggestions generally were
discussed and rejected, as in the case of someone else putting the razor in the
victim's pocket.
Individual jurors tended to focus on testimony that favored their initial
verdict preference: Testimony about the previous confrontation between the
two men was generally raised by jurors who favored a murder verdict, whereas
testimony that the victim punched the defendant immediately before the
killing was generally raised by jurors who favored manslaughter or self-
defense. This tendency is not a weakness, but rather a benefit of the
deliberation process-the opportunity it affords for comparing several
different interpretations of the events along with the supporting factual
evidence. It may be seen as a healthy instantiation of the "counterbalancing
of various biases" 35 cited by the Supreme Court as one of the advantages of
the jury system.
Not all of the discussion of facts was focused on the important issues-
digressions about the defendant's health or his family occurred, for example.
34. Id. at 149.
35. Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 234 (1978).
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Likewise, major issues were sometimes omitted, particularly when there were
no members of the jury, or only one, who favored a verdict for which
consideration of that issue was important. It should also be remembered that
deliberation ended after an hour. On the whole, however, the data from this
study support Kalven and Zeisel's conclusion that the jury does quite well at
its task of finding the facts. 36
The case was, of course, a simple homicide case, of a sort that was likely to
be familiar to the jurors from television and the movies, and the testimony
only lasted about two hours. Thus, we cannot tell how well our juries would
have done had they been faced with a much longer case involving unfamiliar
technical issues.
For most of the juries in this study, discussion of the facts and issues
dominated the first part of the hour. Among the juries that voted early, there
was usually some discussion of the judge's instructions in order to arrive at
the verdict categories, but the discussion was generally quite superficial.
During the course of the factual discussions, the central issues of
disagreement emerged, and jurors attempted to persuade each other.
Agreement on the facts, however, did not lead to substantial agreement on
the central issue of the case: the defendant's state of mind. Jurors tried to
persuade each other that their construals of the facts were commonsensical.
The discussions often became heated, few opinions were changed, and at
some point (often, but not necessarily in connection with a vote), the jurors
would turn to the legal definitions of the verdict choices for guidance.
B. The Jury's Ability to Deal with the Law
Juries worked hard to understand the law. They spent an average of 21
percent of their time discussing the judge's instructions, primarily during the
latter half of the hour. Following the hour of deliberation, jurors were given
an eighteen-question true-false test on elements of the judge's instructions.
On average the jurors answered 11.7 of the questions correctly, a result not
significantly different from random guessing. In the larger study of which
these deliberation data are a part, there were also seventy-two subjects who
saw the videotaped trial, indicated their verdict preference, and filled out the
postexperiment questionnaires but did not participate in jury deliberations.
The questionnaires revealed no differences between these subjects and those
subjects who had deliberated as juries in understanding of the judge's
instructions. 'On a postdeliberation multiple-choice test of factual issues,
however, jurors performed quite well, answering correctly an average of 8.8
out of fourteen questions (since there were four response alternatives, 3.5
correct answers would be expected by chance). Jurors also performed better
than those subjects who did not deliberate. These results suggest that the
deliberation process works well in correcting errors of fact but not in
correcting errors of law.
36. See H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, supra note 33.
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An examination of the statements jurors made about the law during the
course of their deliberations provides further detail in this gloomy picture.
We coded all statements jurors made about the law as correct, incorrect, or
unclear. Remarks were coded as correct even if they were incomplete. For
example, the statement "first-degree murder involves premeditation" would
be scored as correct. Statements were scored as incorrect if they were
unambiguously wrong; for example, "second-degree murder involves
premeditation." Statements that were coded as unclear were usually
statements about verdict-evidence relationships; for example, "If Johnson
knew that Caldwell would be there, it's premeditation." While this statement
is technically false-in that returning to a bar knowing that one's enemy is
there does not necessarily imply intent to kill-it was scored as unclear,
because the juror could have meant that Johnson's knowledge was a relevant
consideration in determining premeditation. Thus, we were lenient in coding
references to the law as correct, and we did not code statements as incorrect
unless there was no plausibly correct construal.
Given this rather generous coding, we found 631 (51 percent) correct
references to the law and 609 that were not correct (28 percent unclear; 21
percent definitely incorrect). Thus, only half of the references to the law were
accurate, even when credit was given for partial accuracy. One-fifth of the
references were clearly, seriously wrong. Whereas factual errors tended to be
corrected during deliberation, errors of law were not corrected. Omitting
from the analysis the unclear statements, we compared the proportion of
times that an error was corrected by the end of the hour with the proportion
of times that a correct statement of the law was replaced by an error.
Considering only these instances where the jury changed its position, 52
percent of them involved replacing an erroneous response with a correct one,
and 48 percent involved replacing a correct response with an erroneous one.
The results are quite distressing, since they mean that the jury does not
recognize the right answer when it hears it. Juries who have heard the right
definition are as likely to reject it as juries who have heard the wrong one.
The jury as a whole does not profit from the abilities of its best members
when it comes to questions of law.
For example:
Juror A: Second-degree stated that it doesn't have to be-he
doesn't have to premeditate that far in advance." (scored as correct);
Juror B: If it's not premeditated, it can't be murder." (scored as
incorrect; the jury accepts this);
Juror X: Now if I got up and I walked over there and you hit me, as
I was coming over, then you hit me, then I pulled a knife out and
stabbed you, that's manslaughter." (unclear);
Juror Y: No. That's self-defense." (unclear);
Juror X: Yeah, that's right. Self-defense would be manslaughter."
(incorrect);
Juror Z: It's involuntary manslaughter." (incorrect).
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During the course of deliberation, jurors generally fought to defend their
correct opinions of the facts but not their correct versions of the legal
standards. Typically the most forcefully expressed position prevailed,
whether or not it was correct. Most of the jurors' discussions of substantive
law (that is, the definitions of the verdict categories) conveyed an impression
of considerable uncertainty ("Was it . . . I think it was something about
passion?"), and jurors who seemed confident about the law were often
believed, whether or not their statements corresponded to the judge's
instructions. Of the 1752 units across all juries that referred to the law, only
seventy-five (4 percent) were error corrections. Only 12 percent of the 609
incorrect and unclear statements were corrected. Examining each jury's last
definition of the four verdict choices during the course of the hour, we found
that no jury was correct on all four of them. It appears that most jurors failed
to absorb a great many of the judge's instructions and that the process of
deliberation did not correct this problem. Hastie, Penrod, and Pennington3 7
used different judicial instructions for the same case (and their juries
deliberated until they reached a verdict); their results were similar to ours.
Further evidence that the jurors learned less than they should have from
the judge's instructions comes from an examination of the frequency with
which various aspects of the law were discussed during deliberation. The
instructions most often discussed involved points of law that the jurors were
very likely to have heard about before they heard the case; thus, there is a
strong possibility that much of their discussion of the law was based not on
the instructions they had heard from the judge but on prior knowledge.
For example, of the sixty possible elements of the judge's instructions, the
one discussed most frequently was the definition of first-degree murder
requiring premeditation and deliberation. Jurors were usually correct in their
definitions (sixty-five correct statements, five incorrect, thirty-seven unclear).
They very rarely went any further, however, in trying to define first-degree
murder. While there were 180 references (including questions) to the
requirement of premeditation and deliberation, there were only thirteen
mentions of the definition of premeditation and deliberation, and only thirty-
eight attempts to distinguish first-degree from second-degree murder (eight
correct, four incorrect, twenty unclear, four questions, and two error
corrections). These results suggest that much of the jurors' discussion of the
law on first-degree murder may have been based on the well-known phrase
"premeditation and deliberation," and did not benefit from the new
information provided by the judge's instructions. In addition, one might
argue that the disproportionate amount of time spent discussing
premeditation was inappropriate in this case, since fewer jurors favored first-
degree murder than any other verdict choice.
Likewise, the familiar phrase "heat of passion" was the most commonly
discussed element of manslaughter and accounted for 125 units of which a
37. See R. HASTIE, S. PENROD & N. PENNINGTON, supra note 12.
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third were incorrect or unclear statements. More surprisingly, "involuntary
manslaughter" was raised in ninety-three units, and the references were
correct in twelve of these, clearly incorrect in fifty-one, and unclear in eight
others. Fifteen of the fifty-one errors were corrected. It is not surprising that
most of the references were incorrect, since the judge had stated that the
verdict category "involuntary manslaughter" was not relevant to this case.
This particular error was highly consequential on two juries in which jurors
who had voted for "not guilty" changed their votes to manslaughter because
they were persuaded that self-defense was the same as involuntary
manslaughter. The fact that "involuntary manslaughter" was discussed
almost as much as "heat of passion" in relation to the manslaughter verdict
provides further evidence that juries rely at least as much on legal knowledge
gained outside the courtroom as they are on the judge's instructions.
In regard to self-defense, nearly half of the jurors' statements fell into the
category "self-defense other," meaning that they were references to the law of
self-defense that did not correspond to any of the points raised in the judge's
instructions.
Another way of looking at juries' use of the legal instructions to guide their
decisionmaking task is to look at the amount of time they spent explicitly
discussing the distinctions between the verdict categories. Of the 1285
references to the verdict choices, only 10 percent (128) addressed the
distinctions between verdict choices. Of these, 26 percent were correct
statements, 11 percent were definitely incorrect, 42 percent were unclear, and
21 percent were questions.
Table 1 summarizes the juries' discussions of the verdict categories.
Clearly erroneous statements were relatively rare, except in relation to the
manslaughter verdict, where a fifth of all references to the law (including
questions) were incorrect statements. If we include the unclear statements-
statements that could conceivably be correct-the picture is considerably
bleaker. (For example, the statement "If you kill your girlfriend it's
manslaughter" was coded as unclear, whereas the statement "It's not
manslaughter unless you kill your girlfriend" would be coded as an error.)
For first-degree murder and self-defense, correct statements outnumbered
incorrect and unclear statements by about four to three, but for second-
degree murder and manslaughter, incorrect and unclear statements
outnumbered correct statements.
Although most of the law discussed by the jurors involved the substance of
the verdict categories, jurors devoted 7 percent of their discussion of the law
to the reasonable doubt standard, and 10 percent to the judge's instructions
about the jurors' duties. The juries were extremely accurate on reasonable
doubt, both on the instruction that the jury should be convinced beyond a
reasonable doubt, and on the instruction that if they were not convinced
beyond a reasonable doubt of a given guilty verdict, they must find the
defendant guilty of a lesser included offense or not guilty. Not one person on
any jury, however, raised the question of the definition of reasonable doubt.
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TABLE 1
JURORS' DISCUSSION OF THE VERDICT CATEGORIES
Total Correct Incorrect Unclear Error
Units Statements Statements Questions Statements Corrections
Murder 1 279 98 19 86 69 7
Murder 2 293 70 41 90 82 10
Manslaughter 348 104 75 86 64 19
Not Guilty 365 142 51 84 72 16
Percentage of Correct and Incorrect Statements
Correct Statements Incorrect and
and Error Corrections Unclear Statements
Murder 1 37.6% 31.5% (6.8 incorrect, 24.7 unclear)
Murder 2 27.3% 42.0% (14 incorrect, 28 unclear)
Manslaughter 35.3% 40.0% (21.5 incorrect, 18.5 unclear)
Not Guilty 43.2% 33.6% (14 incorrect, 19.6 unclear)
Like "premeditated murder," the phrase "beyond a reasonable doubt" is one
that is likely to be familiar to jurors from prior experience, so we cannot
conclude that they learned this standard from the judge's instructions.
Attempts to apply the reasonable doubt standard to the facts of the case were
evenly divided between correct applications and applications that were
incorrect or unclear (for example, "The doctor wasn't clear about the angle of
the knife going in so I gave him the reasonable doubt from first-degree to
second-degree," scored as unclear). The reasonable doubt standard was
almost always raised by jurors who were trying to persuade a harsher faction
to move toward their position. After extensive argument over the facts and
issues had failed to persuade people, some members of the more lenient
faction would turn to the reasonable doubt standard as a persuasive device.
Procedural instructions were also used as arguing tactics. Of the 172
remarks made about jurors' duties, 114 were devoted to three of the eleven
instructions given by the judge: that jurors should only be influenced by the
evidence and law presented in court (forty-nine remarks); that jurors should
not speculate about sustained objections (twenty-two); and that jurors should
not consider the penalty or consequences of the verdict (forty-three). These
comments were also used primarily as a weapon to close off lines of argument
that a juror disagreed with, and generally took the form "We can't speculate
about that," or "We're not allowed to consider that." Jurors applied these
rules correctly thirty-nine times, and were clearly incorrect forty-five times
(for example, "We can't speculate about what [the defendant] was thinking or
what he wasn't thinking"). Only fifteen of these forty-five errors were
corrected. A great deal of concern has been expressed about jurors' inability
to disregard extra-evidentiary factors, appropriately so. 38  These data
38. See Kassin & L. Wrightsman, The American Jury on Trial: Psychological Perspectives 99
(1988); Dane & Wrightsman, Effects of Defendants'and Victims' Characteristics on Jurors' Verdicts, in THE
PSYCHOLOGY OF THE COURTROOM 83 (N. Kerr & R. Bray eds. 1982); Carretta & Moreland, The Direct
and Indirect Effects of Inadmissible Evidence, 13 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 291 (1983); Hans & Doob,
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indicate, however, that jurors may also use the judge's cautionary instructions
to stifle discussion of unpalatable, but clearly relevant, evidence.
V
CONCLUSION
In summary, the process of deliberation seems to work quite well in
bringing out the facts and arriving at a consensus about their sequence.
Errors are corrected, and irrelevant facts and implausible scenarios are
generally weeded out, at least in deliberations over this relatively simple
homicide. The juries also do a good job of gradually narrowing down
discussion to the important issues. On the whole, however, the discussion of
the facts does not produce changes in votes, since jurors' verdict preferences
in the case were rarely a function of a clear mistake on the facts.
Changes in votes are likely to occur after discussion of the law.3 9
Unfortunately, the jurors' understanding of the law was substantially inferior
to their understanding of the facts and issues. Much of the jurors' discussion
of the law revolved around phrases they were likely to have known before they
heard the judge's instructions. The instructions may have been effective in
reminding the jurors of terms they had heard before, but the instructions
were not very effective in educating them in new areas, or even in focusing
their attention on the meaning of the familiar terms.
This failure to apply the law correctly was by no means a failure to take the
law seriously. Discussions of the law took up one-fifth of the deliberation time
and were carried out with great intensity, frequently with an apparent sense of
frustration. The jurors understood that a key aspect of their task was to
interpret the evidence in terms of the appropriate legal categories. They
struggled to do so, but often failed.
Members of two of the eighteen juries sent out to the experimenters for
help with the instructions. In our study we did not give them any help,
because we were comparing the relative abilities of two kinds ofjuries and did
not want to introduce a confounding variable. In a real case, many judges
would have provided assistance. An informal survey of fifteen local judges
indicated that there was wide variability in judges' responses to requests for
help. One judge said that he would actually try to explain the difficult
instructions in plain English; a few provided the jury with a written copy or
tape recording of the instructions when the jury retired to the jury room. At
the opposite extreme, some judges said that they did not believe in interfering
with the natural process of deliberation by explaining, or even reiterating, the
Section 12 of the Canada Evidence Act and the Deliberations of Simulated Juries, 18 CRIM. L.Q. 235 (1975);
Sue, Smith & Caldwell, Effects of Inadmissible Evidence on the Decisions of Simulated Jurors." A Moral Dilemma,
3 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 345 (1973); Wolf & Montgomery, Effects of Inadmissible Evidence and
Level ofJudicial Admonishment to Disregard on the Judgments of Mock Jurors, 7 J. APPLIED Soc. PSYCHOLOGY
205 (1977); Note, Social Science Findings and the Jury's Ability to Disregard Evidence Under the Federal Rules
of Evidence, LAW AND CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1989, at 341.
39. See also R. HASTIE, PRESENTATION TO THE FELLOWS OF THE CENTER FOR ADVANCED STUDY IN
THE BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES (1987).
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instructions. The majority of judges said that they responded to requests for
clarification either by rereading the questionable instruction or by rereading
the entire set of instructions from beginning to end. The judges also agreed
that very few juries requested further information about the law. The judges
also said, however, that they did not inform the jury before deliberation that it
was allowed to ask for clarification of the instructions.
There is no a priori reason to believe that the jurors' misunderstanding of
the law is a function of their mental capacities. It seems more plausible that
the system is set up to promote misunderstanding. Factors blockading the
serious jury trying to perform its task include the following: the convoluted,
technical, language; 40 the dry and abstract presentation of the law following
the vivid, concrete, and often lengthy presentation of evidence; the
requirement that jurors interpret the evidence before they know what their
decision choices are;4' the fact that juries usually do not get copies of the
instructions to take with them into the jury room;42 the lack of training in the
law for jurors as part of their jury duty; the general failure to discover and
correct jurors' preconceptions about the law; the failure to inform jurors that
they are allowed to ask for help with the instructions; and the fact that those
who do ask for help are often disappointed by a simple repetition of the
incomprehensible paragraph.
Research on jurors' comprehension of judge's instructions is increasing,
but there is still very little. We do not even know whether juries that ask for
help do better than juries that try to muddle through on their own. Research
on specific techniques for improving juror comprehension indicates that
improvement is possible. At any rate, it seems profoundly unfair to criticize
juries for failing to perform well a task that, by all the usual educational
criteria, has been stacked against them.
40. See A. ELWORK, B. SALES &J. ALFINI, MAKING JURY INSTRUCTIONS UNDERSTANDABLE (1982);
Charrow & Charrow, Making Legal Language Understandable: Psycholinguistic Study of Jury Instructions, 79
COLUM. L. REV. 1306 (1979); Severance & Loftus, Improving the Ability ofJurors to Comprehend and Apply
Criminal Jury Instructions, 17 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 153 (1982).
41. Kassin & Wrightsman, On the Requirements of Proof: The Timing of Judicial Instruction and Mock
Jury Verdicts, 37 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 1877 (1979); Elwork, Sales & Alfini, Juridic
Decisions: In Ignorance of the Law or in Light of It?, 1 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 163 (1977); Prettyman,Jury
Instructions-First or Last? 46 A.B.A. J. 1066 (1960); V. Smith, The Psychological and Legal
Implications of Pre-trial Instruction in the Law (1987) (dissertation submitted to the Department of
Psychology, Stanford University).
42. R. NIELAND, PATrERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS: A CRITICAL LOOK AT A MODERN MOVEMENT TO
IMPROVE THE JURY SYSTEM (1979).
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